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This paper is a contribution to the forthcoming Edward Elgar Handbook of the History of 
Economic Analysis volume edited by Gilbert Faccarello and Heinz Kurz. Its aim is to 
introduce  the  reader  to  the  main  episodes  that  have  marked  the  course  of  modern 
macroeconomics: its emergence after the publication of Keynes’s General Theory, the 
heydays of Keynesian macroeconomics based on the IS-LM model, disequilibrium and 
non-Walrasian equilibrium modelling, the invention of the natural rate of unemployment 
notion, the new classical attack against Keynesian macroeconomics, the first wave of new 
Keynesian models, real business cycle modelling and, finally, the second wage of new 
Keynesian models, i.e. DSGE models. A main thrust of the paper is the contrast we draw 
between  Keynesian  macroeconomics  and  stochastic  dynamic  general  equilibrium 
macroeconomics. We hope that our paper will be useful for teachers of macroeconomics 
wishing to complement their technical material with a historical addendum.  
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Our aim in this paper is to introduce the reader to the main episodes that have marked the 
course of macroeconomics. We start by explaining the emergence of modern macroeconomics 
as a new sub-discipline arising in the aftermath of John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory. 
Next, we discuss Keynesian macroeconomics, which had its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. 
At the end of the 1960s, it came under attack, first from Milton Friedman and later, in a more 
radical way, from Robert Lucas and his associates such as Robert Barro, Thomas Sargent and 
Neil Wallace. These economists, new classical macroeconomists as they were called at the 
time, were able to dethrone Keynesian macroeconomics in a move that had all the trappings 
of a scientific revolution. In turn, Lucas’s work triggered the rise of a series of new Keynesian 
models aimed at rebutting his claim, while adopting his neoclassical language. The next stage 
of the history of macroeconomics occurred when the baton was passed from new classical to 
real-business-cycle  (RBC)  theorists,  in  a  move  initiated  by  Finn  Kydland  and  Edward 
Prescott. These economists transformed Lucas’s qualitative model into a quantitative research 
programme into which they enrolled a large chunk of the macroeconomic profession. The 
latest stage in the history of macroeconomics is the internal evolution of RBC models towards 
dynamic-stochastic  general  equilibrium  (DSGE)  modelling,  whereby  central  elements  of 
Keynesian  macroeconomics,  in  particular  monopolistic  competition  and  sluggishness,  are 
reintroduced into the real business cycle framework.
1 
In this entry, we shall only devote a small amount of space to the content of the General 
Theory since this is fully covered in another entry. We will also neglect macroeconomics as it 
existed before Keynes under the name of monetary theory (on this subject, we refer the reader 
to  Laidler  (1999)  or  Dimand  (2008)).  In  addition,  our  study  is  limited  to  mainstream 
macroeconomics (for a study of non-mainstream approaches, the reader may consult King 
(2002) or Fine and Milonakis (2008)). 
 
The emergence of modern macroeconomics 
Without the Great Depression, Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (1936) would not have seen the light of day. Keynes’s aim in writing this book was to 
elucidate the causes of the mass unemployment that affected all major economies at that time, 
and to suggest policy measures that could be taken to solve the problem. This was a time of 
great disarray with no remedy at hand to fix the ailing economic system. In most countries, 
the unemployment rate was soaring and deflationary policies had failed. There was little room 
in economic theory for unemployment. The notion of frictional unemployment had started to 
be evoked but it had little theoretical content (see Batyra and De Vroey 2011). So, faced with 
                                                 
1 While usually applied to this last generation of models, the DSGE label can equally be applied to the entire 
stream of modelling initiated by Lucas.   
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the looming presence of the Great Depression, Keynes realised that monetary theory was 
blatantly wanting, and needed to be reformed. 
The General Theory is a complex book, intertwining different types of arguments developed 
at distinct levels of abstraction. Most commentators agree that Keynes’s aim in the book was 
to demonstrate the theoretical existence of involuntary unemployment. This, he recognised, 
was  a  phenomenon  whose  real-world  existence  was  compelling,  yet  for  which  economic 
theory  had,  at  that  time,  no  room.  The  line  he  took  to  fill  this  lacuna  was  to  state  that 
involuntary unemployment resulted from a deficiency in aggregate demand, itself the result of 
insufficient investment. 
Keynes’s book got an enthusiastic reception, especially from young economists. Dissatisfied 
with  the  existing  situation,  they  were  crying  out  for  a  new  theory  that  would  justify 
abandoning the laissez-faire doctrine, and Keynes’s work delivered. As Axel Leijonhufvud 
said, it was received as a “liberating revelation” (1968, p. 31). Dissenting views, focusing on 
the shortcomings of Keynes’s reasoning, were expressed, but the pressure to produce a new 
theoretical framework that might account for the obvious dysfunctions in the market system 
was such that they were hardly listened to. Nevertheless, confusion over the central message 
of Keynes’s book was great, even amongst his admirers. 
Progress (although some readers of the General Theory may consider it a step backwards) 
occurred when a session of the Econometric Society Conference was devoted to the book. 
James Meade (1937), Roy Harrod (1937) and John Hicks (1937) gave three separate papers 
aiming at bringing out the gist of Keynes’s book (see Young, 1987). All three took as their 
first task the reconstruction of the classical model in order to assess whether Keynes’s claim 
that his model was more general than the classical one was sustainable. They all concluded 
that it was not. Although their interpretations were rather similar, one of them, Hicks’s piece, 
was to have an extraordinary future, containing as it did the first version of what was to 
become  the  IS-LM  model.  In  order  to  compare  Keynes’s  views  with  those  of  classical 
economics,  Hicks  transformed  Keynes’s  verbal  presentation  into  a  simple  system  of 
simultaneous equations. He also introduced an ingenious graph allowing the joint outcome of 
two different markets to be represented on a single diagram. The IS-LM model became the 
workhorse of Keynesian macroeconomics, to the point that one wonders what would have 
become of the General Theory had Hicks’s interpretation never appeared. 
The third and final stage in the emergence of macroeconomics consisted of transforming 
qualitative models into empirically testable ones. One person who played an important role in 
this respect is Jan Tinbergen. Like Keynes, he was a reformer, motivated by the desire to 
understand the Great Depression and to develop policies that would prevent it happening 
again. Tinbergen’s (1939) League of Nations study of business fluctuations in the US from 
1919 to 1932 can be pinpointed as the first econometric model bearing on a whole economy.  
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All in all, Keynes was dismissive of Tinbergen’s work, as he was of the opinion that little was 
to be gained from trying to test theoretical models empirically.
 Too much arbitrariness was 
involved  in  such  an  exercise,  Keynes  argued  (see  Bateman  (1990)  and  Garrone  and 
Marchionatti (2004)). Keynes’s reservations were to no avail. Lawrence Klein was of the 
view that the General Theory ‘cried out for empirical verification’, and under his influence a 
second wave of model construction began. In 1950, Klein published Economic Fluctuations 
in the United States 1921-1941, for the Cowles Commission. The main impetus, however, 
came from Klein and Goldberger’s 1955 monograph, An Econometric Model of the United 
States 1929–1952, which  introduced the celebrated Klein-Goldberger model. 
This is how macroeconomics came into existence as a new sub-discipline of economics. It 
soon thrived. The offspring of the Great Depression, its overarching aim was to highlight 
market failures that could be remedied by state action. So, from the onset, it had a decidedly 
reformist flavour. Unemployment — and in particular involuntary unemployment — was its 
defining element. 
 
The heydays of Keynesian macroeconomics 
From  the  1950s  onwards,  Keynesian  macroeconomics  established  itself  as  a  new  sub-
discipline of economics. It was taken up both in universities and in public institutions such as 
central  banks.  Modified  by  Franco  Modigliani  (1944)  and  popularised  by  Alvin  Hansen 
(1953), the IS-LM model becomes its baseline tool. This model comprises two distinct sub-
models, the Keynesian and the classical system. Hence, strictly speaking, it should not be 
considered Keynesian. But at the time of its dominance, most economists were convinced that 
the Keynesian variant corresponded to reality while the classical system was viewed as a foil. 
One  shortcoming  of  the  elementary  IS-LM  model  was  its  fixed  prices  assumption.  The 
Phillips curve, drawn from Bill Phillips’s study of the relationship between changes in wages 
and unemployment in the UK from 1861 to 1957 (Phillips 1958), did the job. It quickly found 
its  place  in  the  macroeconomic  corpus.  The  fact  that  it  was  based  on  a  solid  empirical 
relationship,  valid  over  a  long  period,  was  viewed  as  an  advantage.  Moreover,  it  had  a 
Keynesian flavour since it incorporated the idea of a wage floor. An additional step taken by 
Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow (1960) was to suggest that the Phillips curve pointed to the 
possibility of a trade off between inflation and unemployment — that is, government could 
‘buy’ a decrease in the level of unemployment by accepting an increase in the inflation rate. 
The  most  impressive  progress  took  place  on  the  empirical  side.  As  already  noted,  the 
appearance of the Klein-Goldberger model prompted the development of a new large-scale 
research programme. A model of an average size, in its first version it comprised 15 structural 
equations  and  5  identities.  The  objective  was,  first,  to  make  predictions  about  economic  
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activity, and, second, to simulate the effects of alternative policy measures. Klein has always 
insisted that its inspiration came from the IS-LM model. But significant transformations were 
needed. Above all, the static character of the initial model had to be replaced with a dynamic 
framework. Capital accumulation and technical progress had to be introduced. Some price and 
wage adjustments were also introduced, although only on a limited scale, so that states of 
general excess supply were always present. As a result, the models always encapsulated the 
economy as being in a Keynesian state (Deleau, Malgrange and Muet (1984)). Nonetheless 
the  general  architecture  remained  loose  enough  to  allow  a  quasi-unlimited  diversity  of 
specifications.  The  hallmark  of  these  models  was  their  pragmatism.  When  it  came  to 
introducing  additional  specifications,  this  usually  resulted  from  observations  about  reality 
rather than from theoretical considerations.  
The next important stepping-stone was the Brookings model, which appeared in the middle of 
the 1960s. Its size was impressive, comprising close to 400 equations — at the time the view 
that the more complex a model, the better, prevailed! This development would of course have 
been  impossible  without  the  expansion  of  the  computer  industry.  Supported  by  a  wide 
consensus, these models reigned over the economic profession well beyond the dismissal of 
Keynesian theoretical macroeconomics. 
The success of the IS-LM model cannot be due to mere luck. It has two main virtues. The first 
is its ability to model economic interdependence in a simple and intuitive way. In this respect 
the IS-LM approach is unrivalled. Even in its most elementary form, it lends itself to drawing 
cogent real-world inferences. The second main virtue of the IS-LM model is its plasticity. It 
constitutes an architecture that is general enough to allow a more-or-less unlimited diversity 
of specifications. This plasticity also extends to policy implications, since friends and foes of 
Keynesian policy alike can use it to promote or refute policy prescriptions. 
But the IS-LM model also has important shortcomings. First among these is its conceptual 
sloppiness. Macroeconomists never bothered to define the central notions of their paradigm, 
in  particular  involuntary  unemployment  and  full  employment,  in  any  precise  way.  While 
Keynes himself liked to reason in terms of agents making choices, this microfoundational 
dimension received little emphasis. The initial IS-LM model was static and little attention was 
given  to  expectations.  Later  on,  this  state  of  affairs  was  slightly  improved  by  taking  the 
variables’ past and present values as a proxy for expectations. The ability to capture the 
interdependence across sectors of the economy that characterised the elementary model was 
generally not transposed into empirical econometric models, which were therefore nothing 
more than half-baked general equilibrium models. Last but not least, the IS-LM model has 
been  unable  to  achieve  the  proclaimed  aim  of  Keynesian  theory,  to  explain  involuntary 
unemployment as a systemic market failure.  
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For  some  twenty-five  years  after  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War,  the  IS-LM  model 
dominated macroeconomics. With the advent of new classical macroeconomics in the early 
1970s that dominance was at first challenged and then broken. Yet the IS-LM model still lives 
on. While no longer central to the graduate training of most macroeconomists or to cutting-
edge macroeconomic research, it continues to be a mainstay of undergraduate textbooks, finds 
wide  application  in  areas  of  applied  macroeconomics  away  from  the  front  lines  of 
macroeconomic theory, and, until the last decade, remained at the conceptual core of most 
government and central banks macroeconometric models. 
 
Disequilibrium and non-Walrasian equilibrium modelling 
While  the  IS-LM  model  with  its  pragmatic  spirit  dominated  macroeconomics,  some 
economists  were  nonetheless  of  the  opinion  that  macroeconomics  needed  a  stronger 
microfoundational anchor. The main names to be evoked here are those of Don Patinkin, 
Robert Clower and Leijonhufvud. Patinkin devoted two chapters of his book, Money, Interest 
and Prices ([1956], 1965) to casting Keynesian theory in a Walrasian framework, arguing that 
the  only  way  in  which  involuntary  unemployment  could  be  introduced  into  a  general 
equilibrium framework was by assuming that it was confined to the period of adjustment 
towards  equilibrium.  Clower  ([1965],1984),  for  his  part,  wrote  an  influential  article 
introducing the ‘dual decision hypothesis’, which he viewed as a new way of understanding 
Keynes’s assumption that consumption is a function of income. According to this hypothesis, 
if labour suppliers happen to be rationed in the labour market, when participating in the goods 
market  they  will  express  a  constrained  (or  ‘effective’)  demand  that  is  lower  than  their  
‘notional’  (i.e.  Walrasian)  demand.  As  to  Leijonhufvud  (1968),  he  criticised  traditional 
Keynesian macroeconomics for having lost the main message of the General Theory. To him, 
the “Keynesian Revolution got off on the wrong track and continued on it” (1968, p. 388). 
Keynes’s theory, he claimed, was different and richer from its IS-LM transmogrification; 
hence the need for a return to it. Moreover, while most of the interpreters of The General 
Theory have ended up viewing it as mingling incompatible theoretical claims, in contrast, 
Leijonhufvud strove to show that the various components of the General Theory were all 
pieces  of  a  single  jigsaw  puzzle.  Brilliantly  written,  his  book  was  an  instant,  and  well-
deserved success. Both the depth of Leijonhufvud’s insights and his mastery of the intricacies 
of Keynes’s argumentation were impressive. To Leijonhufvud, the central message of the 
General Theory  was  that  the  market  system  could  fall  prey  to  a  failure  of  intertemporal 
coordination, an inability of the rate of interest to coordinate saving and investment, and that 
this was further compounded by the absence of any signal allowing this state of affairs to be 
detected.  Clower  soon  joined  forces  with  Leijonhufvud  to  propose  a  Marshallian  general  
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equilibrium approach focusing on the equilibrating process rather than the end state of the 
economy. 
In  the  next  stage,  these  pioneering  works  triggered  ‘non-Walrasian  equilibrium’  models 
associated with the names of Robert Barro and Herschel Grossman (1971,1977), Jean-Pascal 
Benassy (1975), Jacques Drèze (1975) and Edmond Malinvaud (1977). Their aim was the 
same as that of their disequilibrium predecessors, i.e. to vindicate Keynes’s insight that the 
market system could experience market failures. However, they wanted to produce rigorous 
mathematical demonstrations of this point and they wanted their model to describe situations 
were  agents  were  behaving  in  an  optimising  way  (although  under  special  constraints).  
Therefore the change in label from ‘disequilibrium’ to ‘non-Walrasian equilibrium’ theory 
was anything but trivial. 
After an enthusiastic beginning, the new approach subsided. While the pioneering articles 
succeeded in setting out a new framework, it seemed that there was no precise vision about 
what  to  do  next,  no  specific  research  programme  able  to  mobilise  a  wider  group  of 
economists. Many of the young researchers who started their career in this line of research 
soon moved to other areas. However, the main reason for the downfall of non-Walrasian 
equilibrium  models  ought  to  be  looked  for  in  what  happened  in  other  areas  of 
macroeconomics. The 1970s were years of high theory. The reappraisal of Keynesian theory 
led  by  disequilibrium  and  non-Walrasian  equilibrium  theorists  was  not  the  only  new 
theoretical development in macroeconomics. At more or less the same time, the ‘rational 
expectations’ school or ‘new classical macroeconomics’ emerged under Lucas’s lead, and it 
proved  to  be  a  daunting  rival.  It  shared  some  features  with  non-Walrasian  equilibrium 
modelling, such as the desire to base macroeconomics on choice-theoretical foundations, and 
the adoption of advanced mathematical methods. Although the two approaches both started 
from  the  Arrow-Debreu  framework,  their  purposes  were  poles  part.  While  non-Walrasian 
equilibrium economists used neo-Walrasian theory as a foil, Lucas aimed to extend its domain 
of relevance to the business cycle. As will be seen, if this confrontation is pictured as one 
round in a wider battle about the course of macroeconomics, Lucas was the winner. The 
theoretical  reorientation  that  he  carved  out  won  the  day  and  succeeded  in  dethroning 
Keynesian macroeconomics. Non-Walrasian macroeconomics was a collateral victim of this 
(temporary) fall. 
 
The natural rate of unemployment 
The Phillips curve had become a central piece of Keynesian macroeconomics; however it was 
not long before it was attacked, with far-reaching consequences. Two economists, the veteran 
critic of Keynesian policy, Milton Friedman, and a younger economist, Edmund Phelps, were 
at the heart of the offensive. Although Phelps’s two papers (1967, 1968) provided the most  
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subtle  and  theoretically  innovative  argumentation,  Friedman’s  Presidential  Address  to  the 
American Economic Association in 1967 (Friedman 1968) got most of the fame for the new 
development. Both were honoured with a Nobel Prize, Friedman in 1976, Phelps thirty years 
later. For lack of space, our discussion is limited to Friedman’s paper. 
Friedman’s Presidential Address had a critical purpose. It attacked two central policy tenets of 
Keynesianism. The first was the view that governments should press central banks to keep the 
interest rate as low as possible, a prescription that Keynes made in Chapter 24 of the General 
Theory. In Friedman’s eyes such a policy cannot be sustained in the long run. His second 
target, the only one that we shall discuss, is the view that a trade-off exists between inflation 
and  unemployment,  i.e.  the  idea  that  a  government  can  decrease  unemployment  in  a 
sustainable  way  by  creating  money.  Such  a  trade-off  requires  a  stable  Phillips  curve. 
Friedman readily admits that money supply has real effects in the short term. His claim is that 
no justification for a money creation policy ensues because these real effects only occur when 
the  changes  in  money  supply  are  unanticipated.  To  make  his  point,  Friedman  assumes  a 
difference in perception between firms and workers. While firms’ expectations are correct, 
those of workers are mistaken.  Friedman shows that in such a context an increase in money 
supply is non-neutral.  A displacement along the Phillips curve takes place. But this is only a 
short-run effect. In the next period of exchange, workers realise their earlier mistake, and 
integrate the rise in prices into their expectations. This triggers a displacement of the whole 
Phillips curve to the right. In order to maintain the rise in employment, the money supply 
needs to be increased at an accelerated rate, so that workers are fooled again. If this process 
continues,  inflation  is  transformed  into  hyperinflation,  a  threat  to  the  functioning  of  the 
monetary  system,  which  compels  the  monetary  authorities  to  abandon  their  expansionary 
policy. While the short-run Phillips curve is downwards sloping, in the long term it is vertical 
at  a  level  of  unemployment  that  Friedman  dubbed  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment,  a 
terminology that became widely accepted. Friedman’s conclusion is that it is useless to try to 
reduce unemployment below its natural level. His recurrent plea for monetary rules is thereby 
reinforced. Managing the money supply is not a task that should be left to the discretion of the 
central bank authorities, and even less to that of Ministers of Finance. On the contrary, they 
should function under strict monetary rules. 
Friedman’s argument was shrewd because he based his attack on Keynesian theory on one of 
its pillars, the Phillips relation. Keynesians could have retorted that his case against monetary 
policy rested on a situation in which there was no rationale for engaging in it to begin with. 
But such a view was only brought out much later, after the main debate had moved to other 
topics. Moreover, while Friedman’s argumentation was a mere sketch (and for that matter a 
rather sloppy one), the course of events, it has been widely claimed, verified its prediction. 
The emergence of the stagflation phenomenon (the joint existence of a high rate of inflation  
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and a high rate of unemployment), came to be invoked as a quasi-real-world confirmation of 
the correctness of Friedman’s claim. 
Friedman’s  criticism  of  the  Phillips  curve  was  hardly  a  frontal  attack  on  Keynesian 
macroeconomics. Unlike Lucas at a later date, Friedman had few qualms about Keynes’s 
method;  they  shared  a  common  Marshallian  lineage.  Likewise,  he  had  no  problems  in 
principle with the IS-LM model per se, his target being rather the policy conclusion that 
Keynesian  authors  drew  from  it.  The  difference  between  Keynesians  and  monetarists, 
Friedman claimed, was mainly empirical. His plea was that the classical sub-system of the IS-
LM model, assuming wage flexibility, was the ‘good’ model and not the Keynesian sub-
system, assuming wage rigidity. 
Our study of Friedman’s contribution prompts us to return to the issue of the meaning of the 
‘Keynesian’ adjective. It turns out that it can designate two distinct objects: a conceptual 
apparatus, the IS-LM model, on the one hand; and the policy project (the view that, for all its 
virtues, the market economy can exhibit market failures, which state intervention, in particular 
demand stimulation, can remedy) in whose service this apparatus is used, on the other. So, we 
can speak of ‘Keynesianism in the methodological sense’ as opposed to ‘Keynesianism in the 
policy-viewpoint  sense’.  While  Keynesian  macroeconomics  would  be  Keynesian  on  both 
scores,  Friedman’s  theory  turns  out  to  be  a  hybrid  combination  of  methodological 
Keynesianism and an anti-Keynesian policy standpoint. 
 
The new classical all-out attack on Keynesian macroeconomics 
As  just  seen,  Friedman  had  few  qualms  about  the  Marshallian–Keynesian  conceptual 
apparatus. His anti-Keynesian offensive was mainly a matter of policy. This was no longer 
true  for  the  next  wave  of  attack  against  Keynesian  theory  led  by  Lucas  and  others,  and 
inaugurated  ‘new  classical  macroeconomics’.  While  the  new  approach  was  evidently 
collective, we shall focus our attention on the work of one individual, Lucas. He was the 
leading character in the movement, and commandingly assumed the role of its methodological 
spokesperson.  
The transition from Keynesian to new classical macroeconomics deserves to be viewed as a 
Kuhnian  scientific  revolution.  This  expression  refers  to  an  episode  in  the  history  of  a 
discipline where a period of normal development is disturbed because of the persistence of 
unsolved puzzles which trigger a drive to change the agenda, the conceptual toolbox and the 
research methods in radical ways. This is often accompanied by thundering declarations of 
war (e.g. Keynesian theory is dead), a confrontation between younger and older generations 
of researchers, the rise of new stars in the profession, and the eclipse of the previous stars.  
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We  will  begin  by  presenting  the  criticisms  levelled  by  Lucas  against,  first,  the  path  that 
Keynes took in the General Theory and, second, the methodology of subsequent Keynesian 
theory. Next, we consider another attack on the view associated with Keynesianism that the 
government should hold discretionary power over the management of the economy, Kydland 
and Prescott’s time inconsistency argument. 
Lucas’s assessment of the General Theory 
To Lucas, Keynes ought to be honoured for the role his ideas have played in the expansion of 
socialism rather than for his theoretical contribution. The latter, Lucas wrote, “is not Einstein-
level  theory,  new  paradigm,  all  this”  (2004,  p.  21)
 2.  In  Lucas’s opinion  macroeconomics 
started off on the wrong foot by being Keynesian. He should have tried to make Walras’s 
static model dynamic, as Hayek had suggested (before changing his mind), instead of tackling 
the easier task of demonstrating the existence of unemployment at one point in time, i.e. in a 
static framework. 
A related criticism is that Keynes discarded what Lucas calls the ‘equilibrium discipline’, a 
basic premise by which Lucas felt that economists should abide when constructing theories. It 
consists of two postulates: (a) that agents act in their own self-interest and (b) that markets 
clear (Lucas and Sargent, [1979] 1994, p. 15). These postulates are deemed to constitute a 
universal requirement, rather than being linked to the specific purposes of particular models. 
In other words, they are viewed as constituent parts of neoclassical theory, which in turn is 
equated simply with economic theory. The counterpart of the equilibrium discipline is the 
rejection of the disequilibrium notion on the grounds of its lacking micro-foundations (Lucas, 
[1977] 1981, p. 221) and its association with ‘unintelligent behaviour’ (Lucas, [1977] 1981, p. 
225). According to Lucas, by betraying this equilibrium discipline, Keynes gave an example 
of “bad social science: an attempt to explain important aspects of human behaviour without 
reference either to what people like or what they are capable of doing” (1981, p. 4). Lucas 
admitted that Keynes’s lapse from the equilibrium discipline was understandable in view of 
the  apparent  contradiction  between  cyclical  phenomena  and  economic  equilibrium,  but  it 
remains  true,  he  claims,  that  in  retrospect it  prompted  a  long  detour  in  the  progress  of 
economic theory. 
Turning now to Lucas’s assessment of Keynesian economics, as distinct from the economics 
of Keynes, the following points should be brought out. First of all, Lucas praised Keynesian 
macroeconomics  for  having  engaged  in  econometric  modelling  and  empirical  testing,  in 
contrast to Keynes’s reasoning in prose. 
                                                 
2 “I think Keynes’s actual influence as a technical economist is pretty close to zero, and it has been close to zero 
for 50 years. Keynes was not a very good technical economist. He didn’t contribute much to the development of 
the field. Keynes’s influence was more political, is more an image of what sort of things an economist should be 
doing, and what kind of life an economist should live” (Lucas’s interview with Usabiaga Ibanez 1999, p.180). 
See also Lucas (2004).  
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The Keynesian macroeconomic models were the first to attain this level of explicitness 
and empirical accuracy; by doing so, they altered the meaning of the term ‘theory’ to 
such  an  extent  that  the  older  business  cycle  theories  could  not  really  be  viewed  as 
‘theories’ at all (Lucas [1977] 1981, p. 219). 
Second,  Lucas  took  a  strong  stance  on  the  Phillips-curve  controversy.  This  opposed 
Keynesians and monetarists à la Friedman: Keynesians defended the stable Phillips curve 
allowing for a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, while monetarists argued for 
the natural rate of unemployment hypothesis. The 1970s stagflation episode, Lucas claimed, 
demonstrated  the  failure  of  Keynesian  activation  policy,  while  confirming  Friedman’s 
predictions. Lucas’s distinct contribution to the debate was to provide stronger foundations for 
Friedman’s insight in his path-breaking article, “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” 
(Lucas [1972] 1981). 
The  most  influential  of  Lucas’s  judgments  about  Keynesian  theory  is  the  famous  ‘Lucas 
critique’  (Lucas  [1976]  1981).  This  asserts  that  the  econometric  models  of  the  time,  all 
derivatives  of  the  Klein-Goldberger  model,  could  not  serve  their  avowed  purpose  of 
comparing  alternative  economic  policies  because  the  coefficients  of  the  models  were 
estimated  by  econometric  methods  (rather  than  being  derived  from  theory),  and  their 
numerical values were independent of any changes in institutional regime that might occur. 
Therefore the model-builder will miss the fact that agents could change their decisions when 
faced with a policy change. As a result, a model of the economy estimated at a period during 
which  a  particular  institutional  regime  held  sway,  could  not  but  provide  inadequate 
information for assessing what might occur under a different regime. According to Lucas, 
only deeper, ‘structural models’, i.e. derived from the fundamentals of the economy, agents’ 
preferences, and technological constraints, were able to provide a robust grounding for the 
evaluation of alternative policies. 
Lucas’s critique was part and parcel of the rational-behaviour hypothesis introduced by Muth 
(1961). It was meant to capture the idea that economic agents ought to be ascribed the ability 
of  guessing  (on  average)  the  outcome  of  the  market  in  which  they  are  participating, 
conditional  on  the  information  available.  That  is,  their  subjective  expectations  about  any 
coming event should coincide (on average) with the model-builder’s objective expectations. 
The change involved is radical, a move away from a backward looking towards a forward-
looking depiction of economic agents. 
Kydland and Prescott’s intertemporal inconsistency claim 
One of Friedman’s claims in his Presidential Address was that agents couldn’t be fooled on a 
recurrent basis. In an influential article, Kydland and Prescott (1977) re-expressed this idea in 
a more rigorous way by building their argumentation on the rational expectations hypothesis. 
This article became an important element in the rules versus discretion debate, on the ‘rules’  
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side. At stake was the issue of governments’ policy declarations of intention. Kydland and 
Prescott’s  bold  claim  was  that  a  benevolent  well-informed  government  would  repeatedly 
repudiate  its  promises  unless  it  was  constitutionally  impeded  from  doing  so.  A  standard 
example  is  that  of  a  government  aiming  to  boost  investment  and  so  announcing  that  an 
increase in the interest rate was going to occur in a year’s time, thereby triggering firms to 
hasten their investment plans. The snag is that, a year later it may well turn out that it is in the 
government’s interest to forego this increase because of its deflationary effects.  However, if 
it does so, its credibility will be harmed, and its future announcements may no longer be taken 
seriously. 
Kydland and Prescott’s credibility argument was scarcely original — earlier versions can be 
found  in  the  writings  of  dynamic  games  theorists  —  but  they  introduced  it  into  the 
macroeconomic debate. Its implication is a drastic narrowing of governmental discretion. In 
effect,  once  the  credibility  dimension  is  taken  on  board,  policy  announcements  will  be 
deemed credible by private agents only if they can be sure that, when the proper time arises, 
the government will have a firm interest in (or no way out of) implementing the policy. 
 
New classical macroeconomics: a different research programme 
The ‘new classical macroeconomics’ term applies only to the works of Lucas and his allies. 
The paradigm that they had inaugurated soon underwent an inner evolution that led to the 
emergence of real business cycle modelling under Kydland and Prescott’s lead. A second 
transformation, leading to the emergence of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
modelling, followed. These three modelling strategies should be considered as phases within 
the  same  research  programme  the  main  features  of  which  were  present  from  the  first 
instalment  onwards  (see  note  1).  Therefore  the  comparison  between  Keynesian  and  new 
classical macroeconomics that we shall now undertake has a more general bearing. 
Drawing a contrast between two paradigms is a matter of selecting criteria against which they 
can be compared and assessing how they measure up to them. Table 1 summarises the results 
of such an exercise. For lack of space, we will content ourselves with only commenting on a 




Table 1. Contrasting Keynesian and new classical macroeconomics 
 
The first point to be stressed is the change in the research agenda that occurred. The central 
object of study of Keynesian macroeconomics was unemployment — in a wider sense, the 
search for the malfunctioning of markets. In the span of a few years, the unemployment theme 
ceased to be an important preoccupation of macroeconomists; the business cycle took its place 
at the top of the agenda. Of course, variations in economic activity are a central item in the 
study of economic fluctuations, but in the new paradigm they are accounted for in terms of 
hours worked without consideration of the split between the employed and the unemployed. 
Another stark difference concerns the way in which the business cycle issue is addressed. The 
challenge Lucas set himself was to construct an equilibrium theory of the business cycle, 
where the fluctuations of economic variables can be traced back to optimising decisions made 
by economic agents. Instead of entering into a detailed description of how he progressed in 
this  enterprise  we  shall  just  say  the  following.  According  to  the  Keynesian  approach, 
variations in employment result from changes in aggregate demand. The underlying picture is 
that labour suppliers are passive, employment decisions being made unilaterally by firms. 
  Keynesian macroeconomics  New classical macroeconomics 
 




explaining the business cycle 
2. Basic model 
 
the IS-LM model  the Lucas-Rapping supply function 
3. Relative role of supply and 
demand 
emphasis on demand  emphasis on supply 
4. The wage-employment 
relationship 
stable Phillips curve allowing the 
policy exploitation of the inflation/ 
unemployment  inverse relation 
no possibility of a  policy 
exploitation of the inflation/ 
unemployment  inverse relation 
5. Micro/macro relationship  under the mantle of the neoclassical 
synthesis; macroeconomics is 
concerned with its disequilibrium 
short-period leg 
rejection of the neoclassical 
synthesis; its equilibrium long-
period leg can provide all the  
explanation necessary  




7. Econometric modelling  Keynesian macroeconometric models 
are complex systems of equations, 
whose parameters are fixed by 
economically-estimated coefficients 
 
Models are simplified general 
equilibrium models which ought to 
be based on ‘deep structural’ 
parameters based on  
the calibration method 
8. Methodology  Marshallian 
 
Walrasian 
9. The nature of the business 
cycle and policy conclusions 
the business cycle is viewed as a 
market failure  — the  policy aim is 
to bring the economy towards full 
employment through demand 
activation 
fluctuations express agents’ 
optimising reaction to exogenous 
shocks  —  no activation policy 
should be undertaken  
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Moreover, this approach tended to consider the supply of labour and the labour force as the 
same thing, taking for granted that any difference between the total labour force and the level 
of employment is involuntary unemployment. Lucas’s hunch (and Rapping’s because the so-
called Lucas supply function emerged in Lucas and Rapping’s joint work (Lucas and Rapping 
[1969] 1981)) was that changes in the supply of labour, viewed as a result of optimising 
decision-making,  play  a  central  role  in  explaining  fluctuations.  His  take,  borrowed  from 
capital theory, is that the decision to participate in the labour market or to produce on a self-
employed basis are a matter of allocating leisure (and hence labour) both within a given 
period of time and over time. Economic agents ought to be depicted as comparing the wage 
rare at one point in time with the wage rate they expect to prevail later in time, say today and 
tomorrow. If the former is more advantageous than the latter, they will decide to work more 
today and less tomorrow.  
This  intertemporal  substitution  phenomenon,  Lucas  contended,  is  decisive  in  explaining 
variations in the level of activity over time. On this insight, he constructed a model of the 
business  cycle  where  variations  in  activity  over  time  are  due  to  two  factors:  exogenous 
monetary shocks, on the one hand, and agents’ imperfect information, on the other. In this 
model, agents receive one signal incorporating two distinct pieces of information. On their 
own,  these  two  pieces  of  information  would  trigger  opposite  reactions,  changing  or  not 
changing the total hours worked. Needing to engage in signal extracting, the optimal solution 
agents will adopt is to mix the two opposite reactions in some weighted way. Hence the hours 
worked  departs  from  what  they  would  have  been  with  perfect  information.    Here,  Lucas 
claimed,  rests  the  explanation  of  the  variations  in  hours  worked  over  the  business  cycle. 
Monetary shocks have real effects but, as argued by Friedman, the government cannot exploit 
them since they occur only when the changes in money supply are unanticipated. 
A  totally  different  picture  of  the  business  cycle  emerges.  Earlier,  the  business  cycle  was 
viewed  as  the  disequilibrium  phenomenon  par excellence,  the  manifestation  of  a  market 
failure. The mere assertion of its existence was seen as an invitation to the state to take steps 
to  make  it  disappear.  In  the  new  approach,  the  business  cycle  expresses  the  optimising 
reactions  of  agents  to  outside  shocks  affecting  the  economy.  In  other  words,  business 
fluctuations are no longer viewed as market failures, and governments should refrain from 
trying to prevent their occurrence. Nor is there any rationale for acting upon them. 
 
The new Keynesian counter-offensive 
Lucas’s all out attack on Keynesianism was not left unanswered by those economists who, for 
one reason or another, felt that Keynes had been right. There were two types of reaction. The 
reaction of traditional Keynesians is typified by the observation made by Lipsey that what 
occurred was the “replacement of messy truth by precise error” (Lipsey 2000, p. 76), thus  
 
14 
claiming that the direction opened up by Lucas and his fellow economists should be radically 
rejected. In contrast, the other reaction amounted to admitting that many of Lucas’s criticisms 
were  well  founded,  and  could  not  be  dismissed  with  a  sweep  of  the  hand.  This  was  the 
standpoint  of  the  so-called  ‘new  Keynesian’  economists.
    These  wanted  to  re-habilitate 
Keynes’s insights, in one way or another, while accepting the central tenets of the new views 
(i.e. strong microfoundations and, when needed, the rational expectation hypothesis). Within a 
decade, several such new models blossomed. The main ones, in the order of publication of 
their inaugural papers, are: implicit contract models (Baily 1974, Gordon 1974, Azariadis 
1975); staggered wage-setting models (Fischer 1977, Phelps and Taylor 1977, Taylor 1979); 
search and coordination failure models (Diamond 1982); imperfect competition models (Hart 
1982) efficiency wages models (Salop 1979, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984); menu costs and near-
rationality  models  (Mankiw  1985,  Akerlof  and  Yellen  1985a  and  1985b);  coordination 
failures (Roberts 1987)
3. 
All  these  models  shared  the  same  purpose  of  amending,  if  not  reversing,  new  classical 
conclusions, thereby reviving Keynes’s mitigated view of the market system. The price to be 
paid  for  this  endeavour  was  a  stricter  adherence  to  basic  neoclassical  principles  and  the 
abandonment of many traditional Keynesian notions. With a few exceptions, these models 
adopted  the  imperfect  competition  framework.  Moreover,  except  for  the  staggered  wage-
setting model, they all were static models. These communalities aside, new Keynesian models 
developed  in  many  different  directions,  to  the  effect  that  we  can  hardly  speak  of  a  new 
Keynesian school. Among the several dividing lines traversing new Keynesian models, the 
following two seem central to us. The first is between the authors aiming to rescue the notion 
of  involuntary  unemployment  from  Lucas’s  stern  attack  by  providing  it  with 
microfoundations, and those who had little interest in such a task preferring to react to Lucas 
and Sargent and Wallace (1975) on the issue of the efficiency of monetary policy. Most of the 
models  mentioned  above  followed  the  first  of  these  two  approaches,  the  exception  being 
menu-cost and staggered contract models. The second dividing line is between the theories 
pursuing the rigidity or stickiness line, be it real or nominal, and those whose builders felt the 
need to retain the flexibility of prices and wages assumption. The majority of new Keynesian 
models took the first line, the exception being Diamond’s (1982) search model, Roberts’ 
(1987) coordination model and Hart’s (1982) imperfect competition model. 
New Keynesian models were as conceptually innovative and technically clever as the new 
classical models they wished to refute. Nonetheless, they failed to alter the new course of 
macroeconomics that Lucas had initiated. As far as the defence of involuntary unemployment 
was concerned, the emergence of search and matching models vindicated Lucas’s claim that 
the topic of unemployment could be sent back to labour economics instead of remaining at the 
                                                 
3 Many of these papers were collected in Mankiw and Romer’s (1991) totemic book, New Keynesian Economics.  
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centre of macroeconomics. Moreover, most of the new Keynesian models operated within a 
static framework while the dynamic stochastic perspective was becoming more and more 
dominant. Gradually, it dawned on new Keynesians that, if they wanted to have an impact on 
the development of the field, they needed to use the new language. This was to happen a few 
years later. 
 
Real business cycle models 
While  Keynesians  were  trying  to  challenge  Lucas,  others  were  trying  to  implement  the 
research programme he had initiated. Kydland and Prescott’s “Time to Build and Aggregate 
Fluctuations”  (1982)  and  Long  and  Plosser’s  “Real  Business  Cycles”  (1983)  are  the  two 
papers which started the real business cycle line of research. Both tried to model business 
fluctuations as the result of real shocks to the economy (rather than monetary shocks, as in 
Lucas’s model). Kydland and Prescott’s paper had the additional feature of wanting to move 
from the model to the facts, so inaugurating a new methodology. As Greenwood ([1994] 
2005, p.1) remarked, real business cycle modelling took the neoclassical growth model to the 
computer. 
Kydland and Prescott’s model is, like Lucas’s, neo-Walrasian. The equilibrium discipline, 
rational expectations, a dynamic-stochastic environment, and a central role for intertemporal 
substitution are all present in both types of model. But there are also striking differences. 
First, Kydland and Prescott shifted towards real technology shocks. Second, they abandoned 
the imperfect information line of research. Third and most important, Kydland and Prescott’s 
work was quantitative. In Woodford’s words: 
The  real  business  cycle  literature  offered  a  new  methodology,  both  for  theoretical 
analysis  and  for  empirical  testing.  …  It  showed  how  such  models  [of  the  Lucas 
type] could  be  made quantitative,  emphasising  the  assignment  of  realistic  numerical 
parameter values and the computation of numerical solutions to the equations of the 
model, rather than being content with merely qualitative conclusions derived from more 
general assumptions (Woodford 1999: 25-26). 
Woodford was right. However, merely asserting that a qualitative model was transformed into 
a quantitative one may fail to convey the full measure of the change. While models à la Lucas 
could recruit only a tiny fraction of the macroeconomic profession, Kydland and Prescott 
were able to devise a research programme that became the bread and butter approach for 
legions of macroeconomists, both top-notch and average, for decades to come. This is the sign 
of a successful revolution. 
The aim of Kydland and Prescott’s 1982 model was to show that economic fluctuations could 
be  explained  as  a  consequence  of  economic  agents’  optimising  adjustment  to  exogenous  
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technological shocks. Their starting point was Ramsey’s (1928) and Cass’s (1965) models of 
optimal growth, which were extended to a stochastic economy by Brock and Mirman (1972).
4  
To the outside observer, what is striking in Kydland and Prescott‘s endeavour is the contrast 
between the model they build and its avowed purpose, to shed light on the development of the 
US economy from 1950 to 1975. Their model economy is summarised in one utility function 
and  one  production  function.  The  production  function  is  subject  to  stochastic  technology 
shocks.  The  variables  considered  are,  for  production,  capital,  the  level  of  employment 
(number of hours worked; not the number of people employed as opposed to those who are 
unemployed) and productivity, and for household preferences, consumption and investment. 
Two additional variables are involved: the hourly real wage and the real interest rate. Kydland 
and Prescott used two sources to parameterise the functional forms of the models: first, steady 
state  conditions  and,  second,  calibration.  Calibration,  a  technique  borrowed  from 
computational  general  equilibrium  analysis,  consists  of  assigning  values  to  the  model’s 
parameters by using information from panels, national accounts and other data banks. If such 
data are unavailable, the model-builder ascribes values based on theoretical reasoning. 
The validation of the model occurs by comparing the moments (volatilities, correlations and 
auto-correlations)  that  summarise  the  actual  experience  of  the  US  economy  with  the 
equivalent moments from the model economy. The model succeeds if the simulation mimics 
the empirical observations. To a large extent, this is true for Kydland and Prescott’s model. It 
satisfactorily reproduces both the low variability of consumption and the high variability of 
investment.  It  also  reproduces  the  pro-cyclical  character  and  persistence  of  most  of  the 
variables considered. However, as readily admitted by the authors, the model is wanting on 
two scores. It is unable to account for the variation in hours worked. In the real-world data, 
these hours are closely correlated with output, but they vary significantly less in the model. 
Another weakness concerns changes in the wage rate and the interest rate; in the model, these 
are pro-cyclical, but in reality wages are only weakly pro-cyclical (almost a-cyclical) while 
the interest rate is anti-cyclical. 
All  in  all,  Kydland  and  Prescott’s  results  are  impressive.  They  were  able  to  successfully 
mimic several important empirical traits of the fluctuations in the US economy over a quarter 
of  a  century,  on  the  basis  of  the  most  rudimentary  possible  model.  Before  their  paper 
appeared, the general opinion was that such an enterprise was impossible! Nevertheless, a 
large number of criticisms have been levelled at Kydland and Prescott’s model. Answering 
these lead to a series of wide-ranging improvements, which we cannot enter into here. With 
time,  Kydland  and  Prescott’s  initial  real  business  cycle  model  grew  into  a  simplified 
                                                 
4 Ramsey studied the intertemporal optimising programme of a representative agent over an infinite horizon, 
subject to a budget and a technology constraint calculated by a benevolent and omniscient planner.  
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canonical model, the twin advantages of which were its parsimony and the purposes which it 
can serve.  
New developments resulted from attempts to reply to the early criticisms, which pointed out 
insufficiencies and inconsistencies. New stylised facts were integrated into its successors. 
This led to a growth in the type of shocks considered. For example, in order to improve upon 
the  anomalous  correlation  between  productivity  and  hours  worked,  Christiano  and 
Eichenbaum  (1992)  introduced  a  shock  related  to  government  consumption  expenditures, 
which had a negative wealth effects on households. Another striking defect of the early real 
business cycle models was their lack of consideration of money. Kydland and Prescott had 
argued that monetary shocks played only a minor role in explaining business fluctuations. 
Accepting this conclusion was one thing, but the nagging stylized fact of the inverse evolution 
of the interest rate, on the one hand, and of inflation and output, on the other was another. 
Monetary  policy  had  thus  to  re-enter  the  picture.  Woodford’s  (2003)  book,  Interest and 
Prices, blazed the trail. 
 
DSGE modelling  
The  mid-nineties  saw  a  decline  in  real  business  cycle  modelling  and  the  concomitant 
emergence of a new type of models, dynamic-stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. 
This move should be seen as an endogenous change rather than a revolution. Ending their 
methodological fight, new Keynesians and real business-cycle theorists came to agree upon 
adopting a workhorse model that both considered apposite — hence the ‘new neoclassical 
synthesis’ label (Goodfriend and King 1997). Keynesians’ contribution to the wedding was 
imperfect competition and sluggishness, as well as a focus on the role of the central bank. In 
exchange  they  accepted  the  basic  components  of  real  business  cycle  modelling  (i.e., 
exogenous  shocks,  the  dynamic  stochastic  perspective,  the  equilibrium  discipline, 
intertemporal substitution and rational expectations). 
Monopolistic  competition  was  integrated  into  DSGE  modelling  by  borrowing  the  Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregator from Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977) model of product differentiation. In the 
canonical version of this model, the economy comprises four types of goods: labour, a final 
all-purpose  good,  a  continuum  of  intermediary  goods,  and  money.  The  final  good  is  a 
homogenous  good  produced  using  the  intermediary  goods.  It  is  exchanged  competitively. 
Intermediary  goods  are  each  produced  by  a  monopolistic  firm  using  Leontief  technology 
based only on labour. These monopolistic firms are price-makers applying a mark-up on their 
marginal costs. If, for any reason, they are willing but unable to change their prices, it is in 
their interest to increase the quantity sold, until demand is fully satisfied.  
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As to sluggishness, this is a notion that had had applicant status in the lexicon of authorised 
theoretical concepts for a long time, and which had in the past recurrently been denied such 
access.  Now,  at  last,  a  satisfactory  theoretical  translation  (i.e.  menu  costs  and  staggering 
contracts) of its fact-of-life evidence seemed to have been found. It eventually became fixed 
in  Calvo’s  (1983)  price  formation  theory,  a  formulation  close  to  the  staggered  contracts 
insight. It is assumed that at each period of exchange, firms are authorised to change their 
prices as soon as they receive a signal, occurring with a given probability. If for instance this 
probability is 1/3, then on the average firms will reset their prices every 3 periods. While this 
price formation assumption can be criticised for being ad hoc, it has been more widely used 
than the earlier versions of sluggishness, as a result of its tractability. 
Another development that emerged in the last decade of the twentieth century concerned 
monetary policy, in particular the rules that central banks should follow. Here a radical shift 
away from Friedman’s vision has taken place: the rate of interest (not of the quantity of 
money)  is  now  the  control  variable.  Two  economists,  Taylor  and  Woodford  played  a 
prominent role in this development. Taylor devised a rule that became popular enough to be 
named the ‘Taylor rule’. It originated in an article (Taylor 1993), which tried to provide an 
empirical assessment of the FED’s policy. The rule consists of fixing the rate of interest 
taking into account three objectives: (a) price stability, measured by the difference between 
the observed and the targeted rate of inflation; (b) the output gap, the deviation of effective 
from potential output (i.e. the output level that would have occurred had the economy been 
competitive) and (c) an economic policy shock, a purely residual shock uncorrelated with 
either inflation or output. Woodford pursued the same idea in several contributions, ranging  
from a 1977 article (Rotemberg and Woodford 199) to his 2003 book, Interest and Prices: 
Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. This book quickly became a standard reference 
in the monetary policy literature.  Woodford’s approach was to address the problem at the 
level of principles by attempting to make a full link between macroeconomic stabilisation and 
economic welfare. Taking the stabilisation of inflation as the prominent aim of monetary 
policy, he nonetheless found ways to couple it with the Keynesian objective of a stabilisation 
of the output gap. He also paid considerable attention to the credibility dimension: 
When choosing a policy to best serve the goal of stabilization, it is crucial to take 
account of the effects of the policy’s systematic component on people’s expectations of 
future policy. For this reason, my work has focused largely on the study of policy rules: 
this  forces  one  to  think  about  the  systematic  patterns  that  one  can  expect  to  be 
anticipated by sufficiently sophisticated market participants” (Woodford 2006, p. 2). 
This  perspective,  Woodford  further  argues,  has  some  counter-intuitive  implications.  For 
example, it makes policy inertia desirable or, in other words, purely forward-looking policy is 
seen to be harmful.  
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The end result of all these developments is that we now find economists holding opposite 
policy views agreeing about the conceptual apparatus upon which to base their theoretical 
conversation. This state of affairs seems to be agreeable to both camps. Macroeconomists 
from the real business cycle tradition are happy because new Keynesians have yielded by 
adopting their language and toolbox. New Keynesians are content because they have been 
able to bring to the merger the concepts they were insisting upon in their more static days. 
Moreover, the admission that monetary policy can have real effects marks a reversal of the 
Friedman-Lucas view that had previously held the high ground.  In other words, when it 
comes to policy, new Keynesians seem to be the winners. 
Another  milestone  in  the  recent  evolution  of  macroeconomics  has  been  Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans’s (2005) article
5. This enriched the standard DSGE model, based on 
staggered wage and price contracts, with four additional ingredients: (a) habit formation in 
preferences for consumers; (b) adjustment costs in investment; (c) variable capital utilisation; 
and (d) the need for firms to borrow working capital in order to finance their wage bill. The 
ensuing  (complex)  model  allows  the  authors  to  account  for  the  inertia  of  inflation  and 
persistence in output, two important features supporting the Keynesian standpoint on the real 
effects of monetary shocks.  
The next step occurred when Smets and Wouters (2003) took up Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Evans’s model and estimated it for the euro zone viewed as a closed economy. Before this, 
central banks were still using models that, for all their sophistication, remained based on the 
Kleinian tradition
6. In contrast, the Smets-Wouters model was microfounded, specifying the 
preferences of households and the central bank. Smets and Wouters estimated seven variables 
(GDP, consumption, investment, prices, real wages, employment and the nominal interest 
rate)  under  ten  structural  shocks  (including  productivity,  labour  supply,  investment 
preferences, cost-push and monetary policy shocks). Having more shocks certainly gives a 
better fit. The flip side, however, is that none of them comes out as dominant. The model also 
embedded friction, which had the effect of slowing down the adjustment to shocks. Smets and 
Wouters’s main contribution is technical, consisting of using Bayesian estimation methods in 
a  DSGE  setting  for  the  first  time
7.  In  a  very  short  time,  central  banks  around  the  world 
adopted the Smets-Wouters model for their policy analysis and forecasting, thus replacing 
‘old’ with ‘new’ Keynesian modelling. However, one aspect of the old way of modelling 
remains: the distinctive trait of real business cycle models was their attempt to be as simple as 
                                                 
5 This article first appeared in 2001 as a Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland working paper. 
6 For  example,  the  model  used  by  the  European  Central  Bank,  the  Area  Wide  (AWM)  model,  was  still 
constructed from a neoclassical synthesis perspective.
  “The model is designed to have a long-run equilibrium 
consistent with classical economic theory, while its short-run dynamics are demand driven” (Fagan, Henry and 
Mestre 2001, abstract). 
7 By supposing a ‘prior’ probability distribution of its coefficients, Bayesian estimation procedure allows the 
equations  of  large-scale  linearised  models  to  be  estimated  simultaneously  through  the  maximum  likelihood 
method, something which is impossible with a traditional estimation model.  
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possible.  In  effect,  they  comprised  a  limited  number  of  equations.  The  new  models  à la 
Smets-Wouters  constitute  more  complex  constructions  based  on  more  questionable 
microfoundations.  
 
The impact of the 2008-9 financial crisis on macroeconomic theory 
How did macroeconomics stand in the wake of the so-called Great Recession (an analogy 
with the Great Depression of the 1930s)? These events brought out at least two blind spots in 
the dynamic stochastic approach to macroeconomics (that is, DSGE modelling in general). 
The first is the limited attention that had been given to the financial sector in these models, a 
dramatic blank once the Great Recession broke out in 2008. The second pertains to the limits 
of what can be done with models premised on the view that, whatever the situation in which 
economic agents find themselves, they ought to be considered as having achieved their first 
best optimising plan. In other words, DSGE models exclude in advance the possibility of any 
pathology in the working of the market system, and certainly of any collapse in the trading 
system to the extent that we have recently encountered. 
This marks a clear analogy with the situation faced by Keynes in the 1930s. Equilibrium 
models convey a Panglossian view (all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds) of the 
working of the economy as they rule out the possibility that markets can fail and that agents 
may find themselves in a state where they are unable to achieve their optimising plan
8. When 
the  economy  is  in  a  state  of  plain  sailing,  this  neglect  is  admissible,  but  it  is  no  longer 
justifiable  when  the  economy  shows  signs  of  collapse.  Whatever  the  virtues  of  the  new-
classical real business-cycle methodology, its limits are clear. To ‘old’ Keynesians, this has 
the  sweet  smell  of  revenge.  New  voices  have  arisen  proclaiming  the  need  to  return  to 
Keynes’s General Theory. Lord Skidelsky, Keynes’s biographer and the author of The Return 
of the Master (Skidelsky 2009), and Paul Krugman, the 2008 Nobel-prize laureate (see for 
example  Krugman  2010)  are  two  prominent  figures  in  this  movement  (not  to  mention 
Posner’s rediscovery of Keynes’s book (Posner 2009)). In Krugman’s words, “Keynesian 
economics  remains  the  best  framework  we  have  for  making  sense  of  recessions  and 
depressions” (2010, p. 8).  
We disagree with these economists. We prefer to draw a distinction between two meanings of 
the Keynesian modifier. The first point to a general vision that can be labelled ‘ideological’ 
without giving this terms a pejorative meaning and which views the market economy as likely 
to  fall  prey  to  market  failures  upon  which  governments  are  able  to  remedy.  The  second 
                                                 
8 As Keynes wrote in a famous passage of the General Theory, “The celebrated optimism of traditional economic 
theory,  which  has  led  to  economists  being  looked  upon  as  Candides,  who,  having  left  this  world  for  the 
cultivation of their gardens, teach that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds provided we will let 
well alone …” (Keynes 1936, p. 33).  
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designates the conceptual apparatus proper to the Keynesian tradition in its heydays, i.e. the 
IS-Lm model. Against the background of this distinction, our view is that the Keynesian 
vision might well ride high again, but we doubt that any return to the Keynesian conceptual 
apparatus will occur. Be that as it may, what is certain is that Krugman’s and Skidelsky’s 
injunctions were badly received by the profession. 
The Great Recession will certainly have an impact on the course of macroeconomics. The 
clearest sign of this is the widespread admission that the loose integration of finance into 
macroeconomic models was a serious mistake (Eichenbaum 2010), and the ensuing surge of 
work aiming to fill this gap. At this juncture, it is, however, still difficult to gauge whether a 
mere integration of the financial sector within the existing framework will suffice, or whether 
the Great Recession will trigger a more radical reorientation of macroeconomics. 
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